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Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[*on the report of the First Committee (A/57/510)*]

57/59. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December 1999 and 55/33 C of 20 November 2000,

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity,

Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability, and that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,

Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security, and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,

Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,[1]

Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Declaring also that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility should apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

[1] A/51/218, annex; see also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 226.

Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[2] is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and that their implementation remains the imperative,

Expressing its deep concern that, to date, there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[3]

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty[4] has not yet entered into force,

Expressing deep concern that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to thousands, and at the continuing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

Acknowledging that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty")[5] represent a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons,

Noting that, despite these bilateral achievements, there is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Expressing its deep concern that emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies could lead to the development of new types, and rationalizations for the use, of nuclear weapons,

Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space,

Stressing that no steps should be taken which would lead to the weaponization of outer space,

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[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

[3] See *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15.

[4] See resolution 50/245.

[5] See CD/1674.

Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility on international security, and in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,

Welcoming Cuba's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[2] and its ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[6]

Welcoming also the conclusion of negotiations among the Central Asian States on a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and underlining the importance of its entry into force as soon as possible,

Welcoming further the progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions and, in particular, the consolidation of that in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration,[7] in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,[8]

1. *Reaffirms* that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;

2. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

3. *Also calls upon* all States to observe international treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to duly fulfil all obligations flowing from those treaties;

4. *Calls upon* all States parties to pursue, with determination and with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of which provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament;

5. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances, pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and agrees to prioritize this issue with a view to making

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[6] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068.

[7] See resolution 55/2.

[8] *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", para. 15:6.

recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

6. *Also calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;

7. *Reaffirms* the necessity for the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to consider regular reports to be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty[2] as outlined in paragraph 15:12 of the 2000 Final Document,[3] and on paragraph 4 (*c*) of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;[9]

8. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

9. *Agrees* on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;[4]

10. *Calls* for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

11. *Underlines* the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress in implementing the international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests under the Treaty;

12. *Agrees* that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and that nuclear-weapon States must live up to their commitments in this regard;

13. *Agrees also* that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included in the overall arms reductions negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:

(*a*) Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(*b*) Further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(*c*) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(*d*) The formalizing of existing informal bilateral arrangements regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Bush-Gorbachev declarations of 1991, into legally binding agreements;

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[9] See *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

14. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

15. *Agrees* that the Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;

16. *Agrees also* that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;

17. *Agrees further* that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992,[10] and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;

18. *Calls upon* those three States that are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997,[11] for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

19. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;

20. *Reaffirms the conviction* that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia;

21. *Calls* for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America and for consideration to be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States;

22. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for

[10] CD/1125.

[11] International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

23. *Affirms* that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

24. *Acknowledges* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 55/33 C,[12] and requests him, within existing resources, to prepare a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

25. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

57th plenary meeting
22 November 2002

[12] A/56/309.